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Abstract	
There	 currently	 is	 a	 large	 variety	 in	 the	 policy	 and	 regulations	 that	 are	 steering	 the	
developments	of	telecommunication	networks	worldwide.	Specifically,	in	the	deployment	of	
future-based	fixed	broadband	networks	(Fiber-to-the-Home),	different	regions	and	countries	
are	taking	a	different	approach.	For	example,	where	the	US	ruled	that	broadband	providers	
should	not	be	subject	to	last-mile	unbundling,	some	other	countries	from	Europe	(Portugal,	
Spain),	as	well	as	countries	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region	(Japan,	New	Zealand)	are	regulating	it	
with	different	approaches.	
By	comparing	a	selection	of	OECD	countries	on	their	policy	approach,	competition	status	and	
fixed	broadband	pricing,	this	paper	aims	at	evaluating	the	impact	of	certain	policy	approaches	
on	network	development	and	market	evolution.	The	paper	concludes	that	there	is	no	clear	
trend	between	the	GDP	per	country	and	its	broadband	entry	pricing	(i.e.	the	lowest	price	for	
a	25Mbps	download	offer.	Countries	that	have	less	parallel	infrastructures	(DSL,	cable	DOCSIS	
and/or	 FTTH)	 typically	 have	 lower	 broadband	 retail	 pricing.	 Unbundling	 or	 wholesale	
obligations	clearly	lead	to	a	higher	number	of	competing	service	providers	(offering	services	
using	 the	same	underlying	 infrastructure	network),	but	does	not	necessarily	 lead	to	 lower	
retail	pricing.	Countries	with	government	investment	in	rural	and/or	urban	areas	report	more	
service	provider	competition	than	countries	without	government	investment.	This	might	be	
a	natural	trend,	or	following	from	the	fact	that	if	governments	invest	invest	in	urban	and	rural	
areas,	they	make	clear	that	only	one	fiber	network	is	going	to	be	sustained.	
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1 Introduction	and	motivation	
The	telecommunications	sector	has	long	been	in	the	hands	of	national	monopolies	in	Europe	
and	Asia,	while	a	limited	number	of	private	undertakings	were	in	charge	of	the	market	in	the	
United	States.	Liberalization	and	regulation	efforts	brought	a	new	dynamic	to	this	market,	
while	the	introduction	of	broadband,	and	more	recently	Fiber-to-the-Home	(FTTH),	provides	
opportunities	for	new	players,	both	on	the	infrastructure	and	service	market.	
On	the	infrastructure	side,	the	deployment	of	FTTH	networks	is	becoming	more	and	more	an	
economic	 challenge	 (Van	 der	 Wee	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Domingo	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 rather	 than	 a	
technological	one,	as	the	deployment	of	this	new	infrastructure	requires	a	significant	upfront	
investment.	 While	 some	 countries	 stimulate	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 government	 into	
deploying	the	 infrastructure	–	 like	Japan	or	New	Zealand,	others	are	working	to	raise	new	
barriers	 for	 public	 institutions	 to	 invest	 their	 funds	 into	 deploying	 new	 networks	 (US	 or	
Europe)	(FCC,	2015.a,	European	Commission,	2014).	Exceptions	in	both	regions	are	rural	and	
areas	with	difficult	access,	where	public	funds	are	allowed	under	certain	conditions.		
Currently,	there	is	a	plethora	of	regulatory	obligations	and	guidelines,	which	strongly	differ	
across	countries.	One	of	the	more	important	points	refers	to	the	need	for	unbundling	or	open	
access	on	fiber	infrastructure,	similar	to	unbundling	obligations	on	copper-based	networks.	
Where	the	US	ruled	that	broadband	providers	should	not	be	subject	to	last-mile	unbundling,	
some	other	countries	from	Europe	(Portugal,	Spain),	as	well	as	countries	in	the	Asia-Pacific	
region	 (Japan,	New	Zealand)	 are	 regulating	 it	with	different	 approaches.	Apart	 from	clear	
regulatory	obligations,	some	countries	or	regions	also	set	dedicated	targets	for	broadband	
coverage	and	uptake.	The	most	well-known	example	can	be	found	in	Europe’s	Digital	Agenda	
(30Mbps	to	all	by	2020)	(EC,	2010),	while	the	FCC	in	the	US	with	an	Agenda	of	the	same	year	
(FCC,	 2010)	 now	 follows	with	 a	minimum	 target	 of	 25Mbps	 definition	 of	 broadband	 that	
updates	 the	 2010	 Agenda	 (FCC,	 2015.b).	While	 these	 targets	 aim	 at	 stimulating	 network	
deployment	in	less	populated	regions,	they	seem	to	be	a	new	tool	to	show	evidence	of	not	
needing	to	upgrade	the	network	in	other	areas.		
Although	these	regulatory	recommendations,	guidelines	and	targets	all	aim	at	providing	high-
quality,	yet	affordable,	services	to	end	users	in	a	competitive	market,	there	is	little	to	no	proof	
of	their	actual	effect.	Therefore,	by	comparing	a	selected	number	of	OECD	countries	on	their	
policy	 approach,	 competition	 status	 and	 fixed	 broadband	 pricing,	 this	 paper	 aims	 at	
evaluating	the	impact	of	policy	on	the	broadband	market.		
The	next	 section	 shortly	 introduces	 the	 framework,	 based	on	parameters	 (input)	 and	Key	
Performance	Indicators	(output.	Section	3	introduces	the	OECD	countries	and	compares	them	
on	policy	approaches	and	their	impact	on	the	identified	KPIs.	Finally,	a	summary	and	some	
dedicated	recommendations	conclude	the	paper	(section	4).	
2 Framework	for	comparison	
This	paper	aims	at	comparing	the	broadband	policy	and	deployment	approach	in	different	
OECD	 countries	 based	 on	 a	 number	 of	 selected	 parameters	 (input)	 and	 Key	 Performance	
Indicators	(KPIs	–	output).	Comparing	these	input	and	output	parameters	allow	for	assessing	
the	 impact	 of	 broadband	 deployment	 approach	 and	 related	 policy	 on	 the	 broadband	
availability	and	pricing	for	end	users.	Apart	from	these	selected	parameters,	the	authors	rely	
on	an	extended	case	study	knowledge	(Van	der	Wee,	2015;	Domingo,	2015)	for	the	analysis.	
Five	 input	 and	 three	 output	 parameters	 were	 selected.	 On	 the	 input	 side,	 the	 authors	
evaluated	both	 the	 strategic	plan	and	 the	actual	 government	and	policy	 involvement.	 For	
each	of	the	analyzed	countries,	the	broadband	plan	was	studied:	is	 it	a	concrete	plan	with	
quantifiable	 targets	 (e.g.	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 population	 that	 should	 be	 covered	 with	
specified	 data	 rates)	 or	 is	 the	 plan	 seen	 as	 a	 more	 strategic	 vision	 without	 specific	
identification	of	the	goals?	Secondly,	the	authors	assess	the	involvement	of	the	government	
in	terms	of	direct	or	indirect	investment.	Does	the	government	provide	financial	support	for	
all	types	of	areas	or	only	for	low-density	regions?	Is	the	support	a	direct	grant	or	does	it	take	
the	form	of	subsidies?	The	third	and	fourth	parameter	aim	at	assessing	the	policy	approach	
in	the	country:	is	there	an	unbundling	obligation	or	even	a	wholesale-only	obligation,	and	if	
so,	on	what	layer	of	the	network	are	these	obligations	set	(passive	infrastructure	(dark	fiber),	
wavelength	 or	 bitstream)?	 Finally,	 the	 country’s	 GDP	 is	 used	 as	 a	 representation	 of	 its	
investment	potential.	
These	input	parameters	are	compared	to	three	KPIs:	broadband	pricing,	infrastructure-based	
competition	 and	 service-based	 competition.	 Broadband	 pricing	 denotes	 the	 retail	 prices	
charged	to	the	end	user	for	the	entry	offer	(given	that	broadband	is	defined	as	reaching	a	
minimum	download	speed	of	25Mbps).	They	were	collected	from	OECD	data	and	expressed	
in	USD	Purchasing	Power	Parity	(PPP).	The	second	and	third	KPI	give	insights	in	the	level	of	
competition	for	each	country:	infrastructure-based	competition	indicates	operators	that	offer	
services	running	on	their	own	network,	while	service-based	competition	is	defined	based	on	
the	number	of	telecom	providers	that	uses	the	leased	lines	of	a	network	operator.	
3 Comparing	policy	approaches	on	KPIs	
This	section	presents	the	actual	comparison	of	selected	countries	and	the	related	analysis.	
We	will	first	give	an	overview	of	the	selected	countries	and	the	collected	parameters,	after	
specific	graphs	will	be	distracted	to	allow	for	a	more	detailed	comparison	and	analysis.	
3.1 Overview	of	selected	countries	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 focus	 the	 analysis	 on	 a	 selected	 number	 of	 OECD	 countries:	 Australia,	
Belgium,	Chile,	 France,	Germany,	 Ireland,	 Japan,	 the	Netherlands,	New	Zealand,	 Portugal,	
Spain,	Sweden	and	the	United	States	of	America.	As	can	be	seen	from	Figure	1	below,	the	
authors	put	a	focus	on	Western	Europe,	but	allow	for	a	worldwide	comparison.	The	tables	
below	(Table	1	and	Table	2)	provide	the	collected	input	and	output	parameters,	respectively.		
	
Figure	1:	Overview	of	selected	countries	
	
Table	1:	Overview	of	input	parameters	for	the	selected	countries	
Country	 BB	plan?	
(Domingo,	2015)	
Government	investment	 unbundling	obligation?	 wholesale	only?	 GDP	(USD	
PPP)	(OECD,	
2014)	
Australia	 yes	 yes	 No,	because	wholesale-only	 Yes,	for	all	technologies,	
FTTH	included	 44612	
Belgium	 yes	 no	 -Yes,	bitstream	for	cable	and	DSL	(no	ULL	
for	VDSL	vectoring)	
-No	regulation	for	FTTH	
no	
42987	
Chile	 yes	 Investment	in	Wi-Fi	 Only	inside	buildings,	but	no	ULL	obligations	 no	 22254	
France	 yes	 Yes,	overall	investment	under	
PPP	form	
ULL	for	copper,	not	for	fiber	 	no	 38858	
Germany	 yes	 Under-covered	regions	(white	
spots)	
ULL	and	bitstream,		no	ULL	for	VDSL	
vectoring	
	no	 44788	
Ireland	 yes	 Underserved	areas	under	PPP	
investment	type	
European	ones,	
Yes	for	DSL	
no	 47796	
Japan	 yes	 yes1	 Yes	for	DSL	and	proposal	for	FTTH	 no	 36485	
The	
Netherlands	
	Yes	(only	in	PPP	
schemes)	
No	(apart	from	some	PPP	
exceptions)	
	Yes,	bitstream	and	ULL	for	DSL	 Yes,	wholesale-only	for	
Reggefiber		 47635	
New	Zealand	 yes	 YES:	both	urban	-	UFB	(Ultra-
Fast	Broadband:	FTTH),		and	
rural	-	RBI	(Rural	Broadband	
Initiative)	
Yes	(infrastructure	separation	mandatory)	 yes	
36401	
																																																						
1	The	case	of	Japan	is	shown	as	direct	government	involvement	as	the	State	holds	more	than	a	third	of	NTT	shares	(the	incumbent	operator).	
Portugal	 yes	 Line	of	credit	to	cover	the	entire	
country	
Yes	xDSL	 no	 28317	
Spain	 yes	 Yes:	PPP	on	rural	or	
underserved	areas	(no	
competition)	
Yes	xDSL	 no	
33720	
Sweden	 Yes	 Yes:	mainly	for	rural	areas	 	Yes	xDSL	 Yes	for	publicly-funded	
regional	FTTH	initiatives		 45113	
United	
States	of	
America	
yes	 Yes:	mainly	for	rural	areas	 Yes	xDSL	 no	
54640	
	
Table	2:	Overview	of	output	parameters	for	the	selected	countries	
Country	 BB	entry	prices2	(VAT	
included),	in	USD	
PPP	for	2014	
competition	infrastructure	 competition	service	level	
Australia	 35.18	 Telstra,	Optus	(both	have	DSL	and	cable)	NBNCo	deploys	limited	FTTH	
52	service	providers	on	the	NBNCo,	SMP	designated	by	
area	are:	Telstra,	Optus,	iiNet	and	TPG	Telecom.	
Belgium	
29.87	
Proximus	(DSL,	FTTC)	
Telenet/VOO	(Cable)	
Almost	no	FTTH	
Very	limited	
Chile	 61.61	 Telefonica	(Movistar),	VTR,	Entel	(those	compete	with	cable	and	FTTH)	
Very	limited	
France	
34.91	
3	main	operators	
Orange	with	DSL	and	FTTH,	
Numericable-SFR	(cable,	FTTH)	
Free-illiad	with	FTTH	
Very	limited	to	none.	
																																																						
2	BB	is	over	25Mbps	and	including	fiber	(FTTC,	FTTB,	FTTH),	except	for	Chile	that	is	over	25Mbps	over	xDSL	access	
Germany	
40.24	
Deutsche	Telekom	(VDSL),		
local	municipal	FTTH	initiatives	(e.g.	Munich,	Cologne,	etc)	
Vodafone	(Cable)	
Very	limited	
Ireland	
28.14	
Eircom	(DSL	and	FTTH)	
UPC	Ireland	(Cable),		
Vodafone	(FTTH)	
Mainly	on	DSL	through	bitstream	(35%)	and	LLU	(15%)	
Japan	 25.81	 3	main	network	providers:	NTT	East,	NTT	West,	KDDI	(FTTC	and	FTTH)	
20	FTTH	
13	xDSL	
The	
Netherlands	 41.93	
KPN	(DSL	and	FTTH	through	Reggefiber)		
UPC	(cable)	
Local	initiatives	(FTTH)	
Around	12	per	area	on	Reggefiber's	network	
New	Zealand	
33.85	
Local	Fiber	Companies	(FTTH)	
Chorus	(xDSL)	
Limited	cable	
87	SPs	in	total,	about	10	per	area	
Portugal	 38.11	 PT(MEO)	(DSL	and	FTTH)	Cobovisao	(cable)	
Limited	
Spain	
49.07	
Telefonica	(DSL	and	FTTH)	
Vodafone/ONO	(Cable	and	FTTH)	
Orange/Jazztel	(xDSL	and	FTTH)	
Around	6	per	area	
Sweden	
49.07	
TeliaSonera	and	Telenor(DSL	and	FTTH)	Stokab	(FTTH)	in	
Stockholm	and	over	150	small-scale	regional	FTTH	initiatives	
ComHem	(cable)	
regional	FTTH	initiatives:	dark	fiber	+	competition	on	top	
United	
States	of	
America	
69.66	
4	competitors	on	national	level:	ComCast	(cable),	ATT	(DSL	and	
limited	FTTH),	Verizon	(cable	and	FTTH),	TimeWarner	(cable)	
Small	players	(e.g.	Google	Fiber)	
Around	8	per	area	
3.2 Impact	of	GDP	on	broadband	entry	pricing	
Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 different	 broadband	 entry	 prices	 (OECD,	 2014)	 expressed	 in	USD	 PPP	
versus	the	countries’	GDP	(OECD,	2014)	expressed	in	USD	PPP.	It	can	be	observed	that	there	
is	 no	 direct	 correspondence	 (no	 increasing	 trend	 as	 one	would	 expect),	 broadband	 entry	
prices	range	from	$25	to	$50	(VAT	included)	in	most	of	the	analyzed	countries.	Exceptional	
cases	are	the	ones	for	Chile	and	the	USA.	We	assume	that	for	Chile	the	geography	plays	a	
huge	barrier	for	network	operators	when	deploying	fiber.	On	the	other	hand,	the	US	price	for	
broadband	is	higher	due	the	price	setting	in	triple	play	offers.	When	a	price	is	too	high	(the	
TV	price	in	the	US	leads	the	offer)	the	other	services	prices	are	offered	with	a	higher	price	to	
not	show	such	a	big	difference	gap	between	them,	(Domingo	&	Lehr,	2013).	As	many	other	
countries	also	rely	mainly	on	triple	(or	even	quadruple)	play	offers	(e.g.	Belgium,	Spain),	this	
might	not	provide	a	sufficient	reason	for	this	higher	pricing	in	the	US.		
	
Figure	2:Broadband	entry	prices	versus	GDP	per	country	
We	have	to	take	into	account	that	the	prices	in	Figure	2	are	entry	prices	for	broadband	retail	
offers	 over	 25Mbps.	 When	 we	 put	 this	 into	 context,	 by	 comparing	 how	 much	 of	 this	
broadband	offers	are	bought,	we	can	have	the	real	impact	of	the	fixed	broadband	market.	
For	instance,	in	the	case	of	Chile	(Figure	3),	it	can	be	observed	that	there	is	no	market	share	
over	25Mbps,	and	the	entry	price	is	considered	too	high	for	most	of	the	population.	The	US	
broadband	share	of	 the	broadband	market	 is	also	offering	 the	perception	that	broadband	
connection	was	OK	to	access	the	Internet	while	they	were	focused	on	Content	and	Services.	
Since	2015,	with	the	FCC	ruling	a	new	broadband	definition	(download	speed	for	broadband	
should	be	25Mbps	or	higher),	most	of	the	users	realized	that	they	do	not	have	a	broadband	
connection,	and	that	they	will	need	to	pay	attention	to	the	data	speed	when	buying	a	new	
telecom	service	bundle.		
	
Figure	3:	Download	speed	for	broadband	subscriptions	per	country	
Although	we	have	used	the	USP	PPP	for	both	BB	pricing	and	GDP,	the	absolute	numbers	do	
not	show	a	clear	trend.	However,	as	the	GDP	can	be	seen	as	a	measure	of	economic	prosperity	
in	a	country,	it	can	represent	the	investment	capacity	in	a	certain	country.	As	Figure	4	shows,	
Chile	still	is	the	outlier,	with	a	very	high	entry	price	for	fixed	broadband	(over	25	Mbps).	Apart	
from	 the	mountainous	 geography	 leading	 to	 a	higher	deployment	 cost	 (and	hence	price),	
another	 reason	 is	 that	 the	Chilean	government	and	 regulatory	efforts	are	 focusing	on	 the	
wireless	coverage,	and	even	their	Digital	Agenda	is	planned	over	wireless	enhancement	as	it	
can	 have	 a	 higher	 impact	 on	 the	 short	 run.	 But	 what	 does	 explain	 the	 broadband	 price	
differences	 in	 the	 other	 countries?	 We	 will	 continue	 our	 investigation	 by	 comparing	
broadband	pricing	on	the	other	considered	parameters.	
	
Figure	4:	Ranking	of	compared	countries	according	to	the	BB	pricing/GDP	ratio	(both	expressed	in	USD	PPP)	
3.3 Impact	of	infrastructure	coverage	on	broadband	pricing	
The	infrastructure	competition	column	in	Table	2	provides	a	good	indication	of	the	number	
of	competing	physical	operators	(i.e.	operators	that	are	relying	on	their	own	network)	that	
are	on	the	market	in	each	country.	As	these	operators	are	however	not	always	targeting	the	
same	 area,	 it	 is	 not	 fair	 to	 use	 this	 number	 to	 indicate	 the	 level	 of	 infrastructure-based	
competition	in	each	country.		
We	 hence	 propose	 a	 different	 parameter	 for	 analysis:	 infrastructure	 coverage,	 which	we	
define	as	the	number	of	parallel	infrastructures	being	deployed	and	operated.	As	we	consider	
only	fixed	broadband	infrastructures	(copper,	cable,	fiber),	this	number	lies	between	0	and	3,	
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ratio	BB	pricing	over	GDP
and	 is	 based	 on	 the	 actual	 copper	 and	 cable	 coverage	 (OECD,	 2009)	 and	 a	 FTTH	 ranking	
coverage	(0-1,	in	steps	of	0.25)	based	on	the	literature	review	performed.	
Figure	5	visualizes	the	broadband	entry	pricing	in	comparison	to	this	infrastructure	coverage	
parameter	and	clearly	shows	a	positive	correlation.	This	observation	confirms	that	deploying	
full	parallel	infrastructures	(infrastructure-based	competition)	may	increase	competition,	but	
does	not	necessarily	decrease	prices	for	the	end	customers	(on	the	contrary).	
	
Figure	5:	Broadband	price	versus	infrastructure	coverage	
In	 comparison	 to	 the	 results	 above,	we	have	 to	 note	 that	 some	 countries	 (e.g.	 Lithuania,	
Portugal)	have	implemented	an	alternative	to	this	infrastructure	coverage	based	on	separate	
technologies.	The	policy	in	those	countries	allows	for	sharing	ducts	amongst	operators,	which	
leads	 to	a	duplication	of	 infrastructure	coverage	without	having	 to	 incur	 the	main	part	of	
actual	network	deployment	cost	(trenching)	(Felten,	2016).	Since	these	practices	have	only	
emerged	recently,	they	are	not	taken	up	in	our	analysis.			
3.4 The	effect	of	service-based	competition	
The	above	described	approach	of	sharing	ducts	offers	the	opportunity	of	infrastructure-based	
competition,	and	although	this	might	be	a	good	way	to	maximize	the	use	of	trenched	ducts,	
it	is	not	the	only	way	to	make	optimal	use	of	deployed	infrastructure.	Existing	networks	can	
also	be	shared	by	 leasing	out	fibers,	wavelengths	or	bit	streams	(virtual	capacity)	to	other	
operators	 (see	 Figure	 6).	 As	 this	 leasing/sharing	 is	 not	 the	 direct	 preference	 for	 existing	
operators	 (they	 allow	 competitors	 to	 enter	 the	 market	 without	 having	 to	 incur	 the	 full	
network	 deployment	 investment).	 There	 are	 two	 options	 for	 sharing	 the	 infrastructure:	
through	unbundling	or	through	wholesale	(open	access).		
Unbundling	refers	to	the	case	in	which	a	single	actor	is	exploiting	both	a	particular	layer	and	
the	layer	on	top	of	that,	while	still	allowing	the	co-existence	of	other	actors	on	top	of	its	own	
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passive	infrastructure/network	(e.g.	PIP	–	Physical	Infrastructure	Provider	–	also	acts	as	NP	–	
Network	Provider,	in	competition	with	alternative	NPs).		
A	wholesale	obligation,	on	the	other	hand,	refers	to	the	situation	in	which	the	lower	layer	is	
provisioned	 in	a	nondiscriminatory	way	 to	different	actors	on	 the	 layer	above	 (PIP	 is	only	
allowed	the	role	of	PIP).	The	main	difference	with	unbundling	is	that	the	actor	responsible	for	
the	lower	layer	is	not	allowed	to	act	in	the	layers	above.		
	
Figure	6:	Unbundling	and	wholesale	options	
As	there	is	no	(single)	source	available	that	provides	comparable,	quantitative	estimates	for	
the	 unbundling,	 wholesale	 and	 service	 provider	 numbers,	 we	 rely	 on	 country-specific	
information	 and	 a	more	 qualitative	 comparison.	 Figure	 7	 compares	 the	 countries	 on	 the	
number	of	service	providers	per	area	(relative	size	of	the	bubbles)	and	the	level	of	unbundling	
or	 wholesale	 obligation	 (position	 on	 the	 Y	 and	 X-axis,	 respectively).	 This	 graph	 clearly	
indicates	that	increasing	levels	of	unbundling	and	wholesale	also	lead	to	more	service-based	
competition,	and	that	the	in	the	case	of	wholesale-only	offers,	the	number	of	competitors	is	
higher.	This	observation	surely	is	the	case	in	New	Zealand	and	the	Netherlands,	where	the	
FTTH	network	deployed	is	a	full	open	access	network.	In	the	case	of	New	Zealand,	a	Public-
Private	Partnership	was	 set	up	between	 the	government	and	 four	 Local	 Fiber	Companies.	
These	companies	were	selected	based	on	a	tender	procedure;	each	of	them	has	the	monopoly	
on	deploying	FTTH	in	their	respective	areas.	On	top	of	these	Local	Fiber	Companies,	many	(up	
to	 87	 country-wide)	 service	 providers	 contract	 end	 users.	 A	 similar	 structure	 led	 to	 the	
founding	of	Reggefiber	in	the	Netherlands,	who,	although	now	subsidiary	of	the	incumbent	
KPN,	only	offers	dark	fiber	to	the	telecom	operators.		
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Figure	7:	Qualitative	comparison	of	the	impact	of	wholesale	and	unbundling	obligations	on	service-based	
competition	(the	size	of	the	bubbles	shows	the	relative	amount	of	service	providers	active	in	the	country)	
The	case	of	Japan	is	a	specific	one.	Competition	was	first	promoted	in	the	sense	of	copper	
unbundling.	In	2004	NTT	decided	to	roll-out	fiber,	and	when	the	government	saw	that	NTT	
was	nearly	reaching	its	payback	of	the	effort	done	by	deploying	the	country’s	fiber	network,	
decreased	the	unbundling	fiber	price	(bitstream	option)	below	the	one	of	copper.	That	way,	
service	providers	were	 forced	to	move	to	 the	 fiber	network.	This	 is	a	nice	example	of	 the	
government	using	its	regulatory	power	to	introduce	competition	with	the	use	of	unbundling	
pricing,	without	the	need	for	a	wholesale-only	regulation.		
A	similar	effect	can	be	observed	in	the	case	of	Spain.	Initially	(in	2009),	the	CMT	(now	inside	
the	supra-regulator	CNMC)	set	this	threshold	for	unbundling	regulation	at	30Mbps,	i.e.	lines	
offering	a	higher	download	speed	would	not	have	to	be	unbundled.	This	 regulation	had	a	
direct	effect	on	fiber	deployment,	as	it	ramped-up	to	the	copper	levels.	It	furthermore	also	
triggered	investments	in	rural	areas	as	this	non-obligation	led	to	a	more	secure	business	case	
for	the	deploying	operator.	Now	fiber	deployment	is	more	mature,	Spain	is	to	regulate	the	
fiber	unbundling	as	a	bitstream	option	(CNMC	2016.a).	Figure	8	shows	a	similar	graph	for	the	
Japanese	and	Spanish	fixed	market,	be	it	with	a	timing	difference.		
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Figure	8:	(a)	Japanese	fixed-access	technology	take-up	rate	evolution.	Vertical	Axis	shows	the	number	of	
subscribers	in	thousands	(Image	source:	Akematsu	et	al.	2012),	(b)	Spanish	fixed-access	technology	take-up	
rate	evolution.	(Data	source:	CNMC	2016.b).	
If	 we	 however	 compare	 the	 countries’	 entry	 pricing	 with	 the	 level	 of	 service-based	
competition,	we	see	no	general	trend…	We	can	hence	conclude	that	a	higher	level	of	service-
based	competition	does	increase	the	choice	for	the	end	customer	(a	higher	diversification	in	
offers,	more	variation	in	data	rates,	download	volume,	and	triple/quadruple	play	options	to	
choose	from),	but	not	necessarily	reduce	the	retail	pricing.	
3.5 Impact	of	government	investment	
When	comparing	the	countries	in	Table	1,	 it	seems	that	most	of	the	public	money	goes	to	
closing	the	gap	with	rural	areas.	 	For	 instance,	 in	Spain	there	is	a	PPP	formula	 if	you	bring	
broadband	over	100Mbps	offer	to	a	rural	area,	which	is	launched	every	year	as	part	of	the	
Digital	 Plan	 (until	 2020).	 This	 approach	 follows	 the	 European	 user-centered	 policy	 that	
supports	operators	that	want	to	deploy	infrastructure	to	uncovered	(white)	areas	(Europe,	
2014).	In	the	United	States,	however,	there	no	such	clear	support	to	deploy	new	networks.	
When	comparing	the	government	investment	and	service	competition	level,	we	can	observe	
in	Figure	9	that	an	government	investment	in	rural	and/or	urban	areas	clearly	increases	the	
number	of	service	providers	users	can	chose	from.	
	
	
Figure	9:	Government	investment	in	fixed	networks:	comparison	of	none,	mainly	rural	areas,	or	urban	and	rural	
with	the	number	of	Service	Providers	(the	size	of	the	bubbles	shows	the	relative	amount	of	service	providers	
active	in	the	country)	
Figure	9	shows	that	the	number	of	SPs	is	bigger	in	countries	that	invest	money	to	catalyze	
some	of	the	non-sustainable	projects	with	only	private	capital	investment.	It	should	be	noted	
that	in	the	case	of	the	Netherlands,	the	main	government	involvement	was	done	in	initializing	
the	 FTTH	 deployment	 (e.g.	 the	 project	 in	 Amsterdam,	 where	 the	 local	 government	
participated	as	a	market	investor	(FTTH	Council	Europe,	2010)).	On	the	other	hand,	Portugal	
and	France	have	just	started	investing	in	deploying	the	fiber	network,	while	it	might	take	some	
time	to	get	the	expected	SP	competition	on	top	of	their	fiber	network.		
On	the	other	hand,	the	higher	service	provider	competition	might	be	a	consequence	of	the	
government’s	requirement	to	only	deploy	one	infrastructure	network	(as	is	the	case	in	Japan,	
Australia	and	New	Zealand).	If	competitors	want	to	enter	that	specific	markets,	they	have	no	
other	choice	than	to	lease	fiber	or	connectivity	from	the	existing	operator.	
Chile	is	a	country	devoted	to	increase	broadband	coverage,	and	their	first	approach	seems	
correct:	a	faster	and	more	sustainable	solution	is	reached	with	wireless	technologies.	Hence,	
again	Chile	is	an	outlier:	there	is	significant	government	investment,	but	not	in	fixed	telecom	
infrastructure.	
If	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	we	 compare	 government	 investment	with	 retail	 pricing,	we	 do	 not	
observe	a	clear	trend.	Figure	10	only	points	slightly	to	the	information	that	investing	in	both	
rural	and	urban	areas,	would	decrease	the	retail	market	price.	On	the	other	hand,	Figure	4	
set	clear	that	retail	pricing	is	quite	set	in	accordance	of	GDP.		
	
Figure	10:	Government	investment	in	fixed	networks:	comparison	of	none,	mainly	rural	areas,	or	urban	and	
rural	with	the	retail	broadband	entry	price	
4 Summary	and	recommendations	
Broadband	is	becoming	more	and	more	recognized	as	a	basic	need	for	people,	especially	after	
the	policy	guidelines	set	out	by	for	example	the	European	Union	in	its	Digital	Agenda.	More	
and	more	countries	have	hence	invested	time	and	effort	in	drafting	a	strategy	and	plan	for	
bringing	broadband	to	all	of	their	citizens.	There	are	however	significant	differences	in	the	
policy	approaches	taken	by	different	regions	and	countries,	and	it	is	not	clear	what	the	best	
approach	is.	
Therefore,	 this	 paper	 selected	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 (OECD	worldwide,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	
Western	Europe)	to	compare	policy	approaches	and	their	effect	on	the	market	outcome.	A	
number	 of	 input	 and	 output	 parameters	 (KPIs)	 was	 selected.	 On	 the	 input	 side,	 the	
parameters	 are:	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 broadband	 plan,	 financial	 involvement	 of	 the	
government,	unbundling	or	wholesale	obligations	and	GDP	as	a	measure	of	the	investment	
capacity	of	each	country.	The	output	parameters	or	KPIs	are	the	broadband	pricing	and	level	
of	competition	(both	infrastructure	and	service-based).	
The	paper	draws	a	number	of	main	conclusions	related	to	both	level	of	competition	and	retail	
pricing.	There	is	no	clear	trend	between	the	GDP	per	country	and	its	broadband	entry	pricing	
(i.e.	 the	 lowest	 price	 for	 a	 25Mbps	 download	 offer),	 although	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 noted	 that	
broadband	entry	pricing	is	much	higher	in	some	countries	because	there	is	no	market	(yet)	
for	this	level	of	broadband.		
Countries	 that	have	 less	parallel	 infrastructures	 (DSL,	 cable	DOCSIS	 and/or	 FTTH)	 typically	
have	lower	broadband	retail	pricing.	This	confirms	that	there	is	no	business	case	for	deploying	
multiple	infrastructure	networks	in	parallel.	
Competition	on	 the	other	 hand	 is	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 consumer	 choice	 and	 keep	pricing	
down.	Unbundling	or	wholesale	obligations	 clearly	 lead	 to	a	higher	number	of	 competing	
service	providers	 (offering	services	using	the	same	underlying	 infrastructure	network),	but	
does	not	necessarily	 lead	to	lower	retail	pricing.	Countries	with	government	investment	in	
rural	and/or	urban	areas	report	more	service	provider	competition	than	countries	without	
government	 investment.	 This	might	 be	 a	 natural	 trend,	 or	 following	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 if	
governments	 invest	 invest	 in	 urban	 and	 rural	 areas,	 they	make	 clear	 that	 only	 one	 fiber	
network	is	going	to	be	sustained	(as	is	the	case	in	Japan,	Australia	and	New	Zealand).		
Chile	is	a	constant	outlier	in	all	graphics	shown	in	this	paper,	likely	because	of	two	main	facts:	
their	 Digital	 Agenda	 points	 to	 a	 quick	 wireless	 coverage	 and	 nobody	 is	 buying	 a	 fixed	
connection	at	25Mbps,	as	it	is	considered	out	of	their	current	speed	market.	
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